Michigan Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 7

1940

DAMAGES - CONTRACTS - RECOVERY FOR MENTAL SUFFERING
G. Randall Price
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
G. R. Price, DAMAGES - CONTRACTS - RECOVERY FOR MENTAL SUFFERING, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1095 (1940).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol38/iss7/14

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS

DAMAGES -

CONTRACTS -

1095

RECOVERY FOR MENTAL SUFFERING -

Plaintiff bought a loaf of bread at defendant's bakery. After she had eaten half
of one of the slices, plaintiff discovered a dead cockroach near the upper crust of
the bread whereupon she became ill and suffered serious emotional disturbances.
Held, no recovery for mental suffering arising out of breach of an implied warranty of wholesomeness. Wheelerv.Balestri, (Mass. 1939) 23N.E. (2d) 132.
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As a general rule the law does not allow recovery for mental suffering
resulting from breach of contract no matter how forseeable the mental suffering
may have been at the time the parties entered into the contract.1 The theory
is that such damages are not to be considered as part of the loss in an ordinary
commercial transaction in which the parties generally contemplate only financial
losses. However, exceptions to this general rule are sometimes made when
courts are confronted with appealing cases involving serious mental suffering.
Unfortunately these exceptions do not fit into any well-defined categories nor do
they present any clear theory of recovery. They appear to rest on the peculiar
types of fact situations involved. For the sake of convenience they may be clas-sified into three groups: (a) where there has been a wilful breach of contract
and an element of tort is present; 2 (b) where other than financial benefits are
contracted for and the parties should reasonably anticipate that mental suffering
will be one of the chief elements of damage; 3 (c) where the contract is such
that only nominal damages could otherwise be recovered and there are strong
policy reasons for giving a. substantial recovery for the breach.~ The factors
which weigh heavily are: (I) the public interest in obtaining wholesome foods;
(2) the h1celihood of serious mental suffering to the person of normal fortitude;
McCORMICK, DAMAGES, § 145 (1935); 5 W1r.t1&ToN, CoNTRAcrs, § 1340A
(1937); J. SEDG\VICK, DAMAGE$, § 45 (191z); I Co~TRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 34-1
(193z).
2 1 CoNTRACTS REs'l"ATEMENT, § 341 (193z); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Roch,
160 Md. 189, 153 A. z2 (1931), where plaintiff ordered a loaf of bread from defendant who put a dead rat in the package and sent it to plaintiff; Larson v. Chase,
47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238 (1891), where a wife recovered for wilful mutilation
of her dead husband's body.
8 Thrush v. Fullhart, 144C. C. A. (4th) 3z2, z30 F. 24 (1915), breach of con•
tract to many; Loy v. Reid, II Ala. App. 231, 65 So. 855 (1914), where defendant
breached his contract to embalm properly the body of plaintiff's child; Lewis v. Holmes,
109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903), where defendant contracted to furnish the wedding
dress for a bride and failed to do so on the wedding day. In an extreme case damages
for mental suffering arising from a leaky roof were allowed. F. Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Murphy, 2z4 Ala. 655, 141 So. 630 (193z). Cf. Plummer v. Hollis, 213
Ind. 43, II N. E. (zd) 140 (1937), noted in 13 lND, L. J. 583 (1938), where
defendant contracted to take a picture of plaintiff's deceased daughter before embalming. No recovery was allowed for mental suffering alone.
4 So Relle v. Western Union Telegraph Co., S5 Tex. 308, 40 Am. Rep. 805
(1881). For the conflicting decisions in the telegraph cases, see z6 R. C. L. 606
(1920). The food cases similar to the principal case can also be thought of as coming
under this classification. Recovery was allowed in Jackson Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Chapman, I06 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (1914}; Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N. H.
4z7, xz8 A. 383 (1925); Carroll v. New York Pie Baking Co., 215 App. Div. 240,
213 N. Y. S. 553 (19z6). Recovery was denied in Youngv. Great A. & P. Tea Co.,
(D. C. Pa. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 1018; Legac v. Vietmeyer Bros. Inc., 7 N. J. Misc. 685,
147 A. no (19z9); Martin v. Waycross Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 18 G.i. App. z26,
89 S. E. 495 (1916); Koplin v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 3zz Pa. 333, 185 A. 744
(1936). For an excellent discussion of the New York cases, see Wilson, "The New
York Rule as to Nervous Shock," II CoRN. L. Q. 512 (19z6). Also MELtCK> THE
SALE OF FooD AND DRINK, c. 13 (1936).
1
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(3) the necessity of imposing greater sanctions than that of nominal damages in
the case of certain types of contracts so that the parties will carry out their con..
tractual obligations. Countervailing factors are: ( 1) the difficulty of measuring
damages for mental suffering; ( 2) the possibility that the jury will render an
unreasonable verdict; (3) the possibility of fraudulent claims. In the principal
case the court allowed recovery for nominal damages, but excluded recovery
for mental suffering on the theory that there was no physical impact and since
plaintiff could have had no recovery in tort the same policy reasons should
operate to deny her a recovery in an action for breach of an implied warranty of
wholesomeness. The physical impact rule in tort cases is generally considered
to be out-moded and courts do not hesitate to disregard it.5 Thus the slightest
impact or a technical battery is sufficient to allow a recovery for mental suffering. 6 If the court feels the need of a peg on which to hang the recovery, it could
be foun~ in the principal case in the fact that there is a breach of warranty which
at least gives an action for nominal damages. Other courts have held this to be
a. sufficient basis upon which to allow a. recovery for mental su:ffering.7 Thus
there is no necessity of applying a rule requiring a. physical impact.8 However,
perhaps the result which the court reached in the principal case is proper if we are
justified in assuming that a person of ordinary fortitude would not have suffered the mental disturbances claimed to have been suffered by the plaintiff.

G. Randall Price

~ See Harper and McNeely, "A Re-Examination of the Basis for Liablity for
Emotional Distress," 1938 Wis, L. REV, 426.
6 McCoRMICK, DAMAGES, § 89 (1935). It is interesting to note how far a
New York court went to find a physical impact in one of the food cases. See Carroll v.
New York Pie Baking Co., 215 App. Div. 240 at 241, 213 N.Y.S.· 553 (1926), where
the court adopted the following theory: "If she had eaten the foreign substance contained in the pie and had then become ill there could be no question bot that she
would have been entitled to recover. We may, I think, with equal certainty go a step
further. If the article of food, when cut, had emitted an offensive odor which nauseated
the plaintiff, her right to recover in this action would have been clear. Can her cause
of action be any less clear because the repulsive character of the food was comprehended
by sight rather than by taste or smell?" When a court hl!S to go this far to find a
physical impact, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that this theory is one •of
doubtful validity.
7 Westesen v. Olathe State Bank, 78 Colo. 217, 240 P. 689 (1925); O'Meallie
,•• Moreau, u6 La. 1020, 41 So. 243 (1906).
8
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